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Vermef v. Boulder City, 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 60, 80 P.3d 445 (2003)1
TORTS
Summary
Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the city after a
homeowner filed a claim alleging faulty construction of a drainage channel was the proximate
cause of flood damage to his house.
Disposition/Outcome
Reversed and remanded. The district court erred in granting summary judgment on
Boulder City’s behalf because the allegedly negligent acts were not committed during or
intertwined with emergency actions, therefore, Boulder City was not immune from liability
under NRS 414.110.
Factual and Procedural History
After extensive flooding occurred in Boulder City which resulted in the city and the State
of Nevada declaring a state of emergency, appellant Vermef claimed floodwaters damaged his
front yard, driveway, and garage. He filed a complaint against Boulder City alleging that faulty
construction of a drainage channel near his residence was the proximate cause of the flooding.
The district court granted Boulder City’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that
it was entitled to governmental immunity under NRS 414.1102 and the Nevada Supreme Court’s
decision in Nylund v. Carson City.3 Boulder City contended that the Nylund court interpreted
NRS 414.110 to grant immunity to municipalities for pre-emergency negligence, as well as
emergency management activities. Vermef argued that NRS 414.110 was inapplicable because
Boulder City’s installation of the drainage channel did not occur during an emergency and did
not comply with its own flood plan.
Discussion
Review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.4 Summary judgment is appropriate
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Subsection 1 of NRS 414.110 reads, in pertinent part:
All functions under this chapter and all other activities relating to emergency
management are hereby declared to be governmental functions. Neither the state nor any
political subdivision thereof . . . is liable for the death of or injury to persons, or for
damage to property, as a result of any such activity.
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where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file
show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.5 "A genuine issue of material fact is one where the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."6
The purpose of NRS 414.110(1) is to immunize government entities from liability arising
out of emergency management activities:
All functions under this chapter and all other activities relating to
emergency management are hereby declared to be governmental
functions. Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof nor other
agencies of the state or political subdivision thereof . . . is liable for the
death of or injury to persons, or for damage to property, as a result of any
such
activity.
The Nylund court considered the scope of statutory immunity granted to governmental
entities for emergency management activities and specifically determined "whether a
government entity can claim immunity under NRS 414.110 for its pre-emergency negligence that
contributed to damage caused by later emergency management activities."7
In Nylund, a flood occurred in Carson City and the city manager declared an emergency
and requested State assistance.8 Carson City employees determined that the best way to control
the floodwaters was to channel the water down East Fifth Street.9 After taking measures to do so,
the floodwaters on East Fifth Street overflowed storm drains and flooded the Nylunds'
condominium.10 The Nylunds sued Carson City for the damage to their condominium claiming
design defects in the storm drain system and Carson City's decision to channel the waters down
East Fifth Street caused the flooding on their property.11
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for Carson City, the Nevada
Supreme Court broadly construed NRS 414.110 "to cover not only negligent emergency
management, but also any previous negligence that contributed to the damage caused by the
emergency management activities" (i.e., any negligent pre-flood design, operation, or
maintenance activities that are causally related to damage caused by the emergency management
activities).12 The Nylund court reasoned that this interpretation was a "natural extension of the
policy underlying NRS 414.110. Because emergencies are sudden and unexpected, the court
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noted that the response authority does not have time to assess whether unknown or unforeseen
obstacles created by past negligence will hinder its course of action."13
The Vermef court then clarified its opinion in Nylund.
Nylund affords immunity to government entities for negligent emergency
management and for pre-emergency negligence that contributed to the damage
caused by the emergency management activities. Therefore, a government entity
is afforded immunity for pre-emergency negligence when the damage caused by
the negligent emergency management was exacerbated by the pre- emergency
negligence.14
But, a government entity is not immune from liability for its pre-emergency negligence
that is not intertwined with damage caused by later negligent emergency management activities.
The court then explained that the purpose of NRS 414.110 is to grant immunity to government
entities for actions taken during a sudden and unforeseen crisis. In Nylund, the court noted that
immunity is granted for negligent emergency management activities because in "an emergency,
the government entity leading the response operation does not have time to deliberate and chart a
course calculated to provide the customary degree of due care."15 To grant immunity for preemergency negligence, which is wholly independent from negligent emergency management,
would not comport with the policy underlying NRS 414.110.
Conclusion
The court concluded that because Boulder City's allegedly negligent acts were not
committed during or intertwined with emergency actions, it was not immune from liability under
NRS 414.110.
Although the damage to Vermef's property occurred during an emergency, it was not a
result of negligent emergency management on Boulder City's part. Vermef did not allege that the
damage to his property resulted from an emergency management decision; rather, Vermef
asserted that the damage was due solely to pre-emergency installation of the drainage channel
adjacent to his home. Boulder City's actions in this case resulted from on-going flood retention
planning occurring within Clark County as a result of community growth and continued seasonal
flooding within the Las Vegas Valley.
Consequently, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
on Boulder City's behalf and reversed and remanded.
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